MADRID – Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, granted an extensive interview to national television in which he discussed in detail the 12-day war between Iran and Israel, a conflict that marked a turning point for the Islamic Republic on multiple levels. 

In this dialogue with documentary filmmaker Javad Moghui, Qalibaf offered a clear technical and political perspective, acknowledging weaknesses exposed during the conflict while simultaneously emphasizing the resilience and adaptive capacity of Iran’s armed forces.

Among the most notable points of his discussion were the neutralization of prior sabotage attempts targeting Iran’s missile program—a direct reference to operations similar to the device explosions in Lebanon; the renewal of command within the ranks of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) in the presence of Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei; the explicit support of President Masoud Pezeshkian for the armed forces; the demand for clear conditions for any potential ceasefire; and the technical and tactical modernization of Iran’s missile capabilities.

Qalibaf revealed that, for years, the enemy had managed to infiltrate chips and electronic systems into the military chain of command, affecting some missile platforms. Nevertheless, he explained that approximately seven years ago this vulnerability was detected and rectified—a fact that underscores both the technical complexity of the confrontation and Tehran’s ability to respond to covert operations. This scenario highlights the hostile strategic behavior Iran faces, which extends beyond open confrontations to include advanced sabotage targeting critical military infrastructure.

One episode Qalibaf addressed with particular frankness was the delay in Iran’s response following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, rejecting accusations of “government obstruction or commanders’ fear.” His technical explanation focused on the limited results of a missile attack identified as “Operation True Promise 1,” in which satellite systems allowed the enemy to monitor and divert some Iranian missiles in real time, achieving a lower effectiveness than anticipated. The lessons drawn from that episode were treated as an urgent warning to reinforce and modernize offensive systems, demonstrating a capacity for self-criticism and learning rarely recognized in Western analyses of the conflict.

Regarding military operations during the 12 days of hostilities, Qalibaf emphasized the increasing precision and sophistication of the attacks. He explained that from the first to the seventh day, the strategy involved launches both day and night, with fewer missiles but greater effectiveness. He recalled the impact on the strategic Israeli city of Beer Sheva, where a single Iranian missile was fired and managed to successfully hit its target. Additionally, he elaborated on missile launches after the supposed start of a ceasefire declared by Iranian officials, arguing that since Israel was the initial aggressor, the Supreme National Security Council of Iran decided that the final response would come from Tehran.

From a military perspective, this narrative serves a crucial role: it not only demonstrates defensive strength but also projects a policy of proportional and controlled response, aimed at minimizing tactical errors and maintaining high internal morale while sending a message of calculated strength internationally.

Hamas and Hezbollah 

In the interview, Qalibaf was directly questioned about the Hamas operation on October 7 and whether, given the significant weakening of Hamas, it could be considered a tactical error. His response began by emphasizing the importance of context: Hamas, he noted, did not act as a nihilist group, but as a force seeking to liberate its land from occupation.

The interviewer pressed on whether the decision to attack itself was a mistake. Qalibaf replied that it was an action taken independently by Hamas, without prior participation or knowledge from Iran or Hezbollah. He also rejected the notion that Israel allowed the attack to create a pretext, stressing that the operation disrupted Israel’s image of absolute intelligence dominance and that Tel Aviv, if given a choice, would not have subjected itself to two years of open conflict without a clear victory.

Qalibaf stressed that both Hamas and Hezbollah operate with sovereignty and make their own military decisions based on what they interpret as their peoples’ interests. Iran, he affirmed, does not interfere with this tactical autonomy, although it continues to provide political and logistical support as long as a shared strategic vision exists. This explanation situates Iranian policy within a framework of mutual respect and regional coordination, avoiding imposition and reinforcing a narrative of alliance based on affinity rather than subordination.

Another topic discussed was Hezbollah’s role. When asked to compare it with the 2006 war and the losses suffered in the recent conflict, Qalibaf denied that the Lebanese organization had been defeated. He recounted his personal experiences visiting at three critical moments: in 1982, when Israel reached Beirut; after 2006, when Hezbollah consolidated its position; and in October 2024, when he traveled to Lebanon during the offensive. In all cases, he insisted, resistance successfully impeded Israel’s plans.

He explained that every war has highs and lows, and a tactical setback does not equate to a strategic defeat. “No one would say Israel lost the war on October 8 due to a moment of weakness,” he noted. He further emphasized that the insistence of the United States on demanding Hezbollah’s disarmament demonstrates its enduring significance in the regional equation. As an additional example, he cited Gaza, under total blockade yet still capable of developing sophisticated weaponry and maintaining active confrontation.

When asked for concrete examples, Qalibaf indicated that following attacks on communication systems and the martyrdom of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Israel launched a ground offensive with five divisions up to the Litani River, which failed. Hezbollah, he said, resisted on the ground and forced Israeli troops to abandon their advance. From his perspective, the current state of the Lebanese organization is even stronger than in previous conflicts.

Asked why he traveled to Beirut during the war, Qalibaf explained that his presence aimed to boost troop morale after Nasrallah’s loss, comparing the situation to his combat experiences during the Iran-Iraq war. He confirmed that he personally piloted the plane during landing, under the threat of drones and bombings, as part of a deliberate effort to convey confidence to fighters on the ground.